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Emotion recognition was investigated in typically developing individuals and individuals with autism.
Experiment 1 tested children (5–7 years, n = 37) with brief video displays of facial expressions that varied in
subtlety. Children with autism performed worse than the control children. In Experiment 2, 3 age groups
(8–12 years, n = 49; 13–17 years, n = 49; and adults n = 45) were tested on the same stimuli. Whereas the
performance of control individuals was best in the adult group, the performance of individuals with autism
was similar in all age groups. Results are discussed with respect to underlying cognitive processes that may
be affecting the development of emotion recognition in individuals with autism.
When Kanner first articulated his description of the
autistic child in 1943, he viewed ‘‘[their] inability to
form the usual, biologically provided affective con-
tact with people,’’ as a primary feature of the dis-
order (Kanner, 1943). Since that time, numerous
studies have further elucidated the components of
this complex syndrome. Kanner’s original concep-
tualization has now been somewhat modified, but
‘‘disturbances in affective contact’’ are still cited as
a central feature of autism. Relating emotionally to
others presents a major challenge to individuals
with autism as they maneuver through the social
world. Both clinicians (Attwood, 1998; Hobson,
2004) and parents (Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, &
Sigman, 1993) note that for individuals with autism,
one of the difficulties they face in their understand-
ing of self and others is in the understanding of
emotion. Individuals with autism frequently fail to
react appropriately to the emotions of others, and
researchers have suggested that an impairment in
emotional expression recognition may contribute to
these inappropriate reactions and to their under-
standing of emotion in general.
Emotion Recognition in Typically Developing
Individuals
The ability to recognize facial expressions of emo-
tion is crucial to establishing interpersonal connec-
tions early in life. Recognition of facial expressions
is one of the primary signals used to understand the
feelings and intentions of others, and it has been
argued that the ability to recognize basic emotional
expressions may be universal (Darwin, 1872;
Ekman, 2003). Research has shown that typically
developing infants can discriminate static displays
of happy, sad, and surprised faces as early as 3 or
4 months of age (Young-Browne, Rosenfeld, &
Horowitz, 1977), and dynamic displays of happy
and angry faces by 7 months of age (Soken & Pick,
1992). By the age of 4 years, typically developing
children can freely label prototypical (full or exag-
gerated) displays of happiness, sadness, and anger
with almost perfect accuracy, and are also becoming
more adept at recognizing fear and surprise (Widen
& Russell, 2003). Although some research suggests
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the ability to recognize most emotional expressions
reaches adult levels by 10 years of age (e.g., Bruce
et al., 2000; Durand, Gallay, Seigneuri, Robichon, &
Baudouin, 2007; Mondloch, Geldart, Maurer, & Le
Grand, 2003), this appears to be dependant on task
demands. Although by this age children are able to
identify prototypical emotional expressions at levels
comparable to adults, studies indicate that even by
adolescence, individuals may still exhibit some diffi-
culty with recognizing less intense emotions (Herba,
Landau, Russell, Ecker, & Phillips, 2006; Thomas,
De Bellis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007). This skill, along
with the speed with which individuals process
emotions, appears to continue to develop through
adolescence before reaching its peak in adulthood
(De Sonneville et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). By
adulthood, individuals are not only highly profi-
cient and very fast at perceiving prototypical
expressions of emotions in others (De Sonneville
et al., 2002; Ekman, 2003), but they are also able to
identify even very subtle expressions of emotion
(Calder, Young, Perrett, Etcoff, & Rowland, 1996).
Emotion Recognition in Individuals With Autism
Over 35 studies have examined the ability of
both children and adults with autism to recognize
common categories of facial expression, yet no
studies to date have clearly delineated the develop-
mental course of this skill in this population.
Indeed, it remains unclear if individuals with
autism truly have a deficit in recognizing emotional
expression in faces. Some studies suggest the ability
is intact (e.g., Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992;
Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001; Ozonoff,
Pennington, & Rogers, 1990), whereas others
suggest it is impaired relative to controls (Celani,
Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Hobson, Ouston, &
Lee, 1989; Lindner & Rosen, 2006; Macdonald et al.,
1989). Given the plethora of methodologies applied
to this question and the wide age ranges of the
samples used, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what
accounts for these equivocal findings. Researchers
appear to be more focused on how individuals with
autism perform relative to controls and are failing
to consider the developmental course of this ability
and how the age of the participants and the meth-
odology employed might affect their results. When
the literature is reframed in this light, a somewhat
more consistent trend begins to emerge.
Studies using perceptually oriented tasks (e.g.,
matching, ‘‘same or different,’’ and sorting) to test
emotion recognition suggest that when individuals
with autism of all ages are given unambiguous, rela-
tively prototypic stimuli and sufficient processing
time, they are capable of performing at levels similar
to control groups (e.g., Gepner et al., 2001; Hobson,
Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Humphreys, Minshew, Leon-
ard, & Behrmann, 2007; Ozonoff et al., 1990; Piggot
et al., 2004). Findings from studies that require par-
ticipants to produce a label for or match a label to a
facial expression are more equivocal. Only when
close attention is paid to the age of the participants
involved does a clearer picture emerge. Findings
suggest that by 10 years of age, both low- and high-
functioning children with autism are worse than
controls at labeling basic, prototypic expressions
(Lindner & Rosen, 2006; Tantam, Monaghan, Nichol-
son, & Stirling, 1989). By 12 years of age, however,
high-functioning children with autism are typically
no different from controls at recognizing basic, pro-
totypic expressions, and this lack of a difference
appears to be consistent in the vast majority of stud-
ies examining high-functioning individuals from
12 years through to adulthood (e.g., Capps et al.,
1992; Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000).
Although these studies show limited impairment for
basic, prototypical emotions, other research shows
that individuals with autism have difficulty when
the stimuli are either shown only briefly (Critchley
et al., 2000; Mazefsky & Oswald, 2007; Pelphrey
et al., 2002) or when the stimuli are more subtle
(Humphreys et al., 2007). Although not directly
tested, these studies suggest that individuals with
autism become more adept at recognizing basic, pro-
totypic emotional expressions as they become older
but that even adults may still struggle with more
fleeting or subtle emotions. In essence, individuals
with autism may never reach the level of proficiency
demonstrated by typically developing adults.
To date, studies of emotion recognition in indi-
viduals with autism have not adequately examined
the participants’ true level of proficiency at recog-
nizing expressions. When examining studies of
emotion recognition in autism, it is apparent that
the majority of studies allow participants to examine
the stimuli for as long as necessary before providing
a response (e.g., Hobson et al., 1989; Humphreys
et al., 2007; Macdonald et al., 1989). This may not
reflect the demands and processes required when
recognizing expressions in natural settings.
The degree of exaggeration of the expression that
must be recognized is also important to consider.
Many expressions portrayed in everyday settings
are subtle. Thus, only the ability to process the
nuances of less intense emotions will allow for suc-
cessful recognition of that emotion. The prototypic
emotion stimuli that are most commonly presented
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in studies with individuals with autism may not
test the limits of their abilities and hence may mask
existing difficulties.
The current study sought to examine the devel-
opment of emotion recognition skills in individuals
with autism using a paradigm that examined more
closely their true level of proficiency. Given that in
typically developing individuals proficiency at
emotion recognition seems to continue to develop
through adulthood, this study is unique in address-
ing the development of emotion recognition in indi-
viduals with autism by using well-matched groups
of children, adolescents, and adults with the goal of
determining how individuals at various ages
performed on the same tasks. In addition, stimuli
varied in subtlety and were presented very briefly
in order to test the limits of our participants’ abili-
ties. Finally, dynamic video stimuli were presented
because dynamic emotion displays facilitate recog-
nition, particularly for more subtle facial expres-




Participants were 19 children with high-function-
ing autism and 18 matched controls recruited from
an educational organization that specializes in edu-
cating children with autism. Children with autism
were previously diagnosed at this institute by child
psychologists who had expertise in autism. In addi-
tion, at the time of the study these children were
administered a diagnostic evaluation consisting of
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule–
General (ADOS–G; Lord et al., 2000); only those
children meeting the cutoff scores for autism on the
ADOS–G algorithm were included. Children with
Asperger’s disorder or Pervasive Developmental
Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) were
excluded (see Table 1 for mean ADOS scores). The 18
control participants were matched on chronological
age and a standard score equivalent of Verbal Mental
Age (VMA) obtained using the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test–Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). No
significant differences were found between groups
in terms of chronological age and VMA (see Table 1).
Apparatus
Both control and autism participants were
tested either at home or in the laboratory, depend-
ing on the parents’ preference. Participants sat in
front of a 43-cm monitor controlled by a laptop
computer.
Stimuli
For the pretest, 12 colored photographs of proto-
typical facial expressions were selected from the
NimStim face stimulus set (3 each of happy, sad,
angry, and afraid; Tottenham et al., 2009). Each
model only appeared once within the stimulus set.
To create dynamic stimuli for the test phase,
approximately 60 digital videos were made of vol-
unteer male and female adults ranging in age from
18 to 30 years. Volunteers all wore a black robe to
hide clothing and were filmed in front of a black
background so that the videos provided a dynamic
display of just the face. Each volunteer was
instructed to model the facial expressions of happy,
sad, angry, and afraid. All videos were viewed by
four individuals (one of whom had training and
experience in the Facial Action Coding System;
Ekman & Friesen, 1975), and the one best example
of each emotion was chosen by consensus. Thus,
four videos, each exhibiting a different emotional
expression, were chosen to be used for the final test
stimuli. Each emotional expression was posed by a
different model. An additional video of happy was
selected to serve as the sample video for the test
phase; this model was different from those selected
for the test phase.
Table 1






M SD M SD
Age (years) 6.4 0.8 6.0 0.8





Gender (M:F) 14:5 11:7
Ethnicity 19 Caucasian 18 Caucasian
Note. VMA = Verbal Mental Age standard score (M =100,
SD = 15); ADOS = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule;
ADOS Comm = score on the Communication subscale;
ADOS Soc = score on the Reciprocal Social Interaction subscale;
ADOS Total = Comm + Soc. Ethnicity was obtained by self-
report.
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Each of the selected videos (four for the test
phase and one sample) was edited so that it pro-
gressed from a neutral expression to the prototypi-
cal pose of that expression. This was accomplished
by careful examination of the videos in a frame-
by-frame fashion. Following this editing, each video
was then divided into four film clips, each moving
from either neutral to 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of
the expression (to be referred to as Levels I, II, III
and IV, respectively). This allowed for a total of 16
trial stimuli (four clips of each of the four emo-
tions). Static images of the endpoint for each of
these stimuli can be seen in Figure 1.
Following this procedure, digital videos were
edited such that each clip was prefaced by a black
screen with a centered yellow ‘‘ball’’ of approxi-
mately 2.54 cm in diameter. This was done to pro-
vide a fixation point to ensure that attention was
focused on the center of the screen prior to viewing
each clip. Thus the video progressed from a fixation
point to a neutral expression and then proceeded to
Levels I, II, III, or IV. After the partial or whole
expression was reached, the video would return to
the original black screen with fixation point. To
ensure that no exposure-time advantage would
occur, each clip was edited to run for a length of
500 ms.
Video clips were piloted on undergraduate stu-
dents (n = 29). After viewing each clip, the screen
went blank, and participants were asked to identify
the emotion. In addition, they were asked to indi-
cate how confident they were of their judgment on
a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating a guess
response and 7 indicating a certain response. The
clips were presented level by level from the most
difficult (i.e., Level I) to the least difficult (i.e., Level
IV). The four different emotions were randomized
within level. Pilot ratings indicated that by Level III
of each emotion video, the majority of participants
were able to make an accurate identification. See
Appendix A for accuracy percentages and ‘‘confi-
dence in decision’’ ratings.
Procedure
Pretest. To ensure that participants understood
and recognized the facial expressions of happy,
sad, angry, and fearful, they were presented with
the 12 stimuli from the NimStim display set. Partic-
ipants were first presented with a sheet of paper
with iconic face drawings displaying each of the
four emotions as well as a neutral expression. These
served as the answer choices for both the pretest
and test phases. Participants were then presented
with three sets of the four target emotions, with the
emotions randomized within each set, and were
asked to name the displayed emotion. The stimuli
were displayed on the screen one at a time, and
they remained on the screen until the participant
verbalized a response or pointed to one of the ico-
nic faces. All participants were able to identify
these exaggerated, static expressions with over 90%
accuracy.
Test. Participants were read instructions prior to
the test phase (see Appendix B). They were then
shown the Level I video clips of each emotion in
randomized order. After all Level I clips were seen,
each of the successive levels was shown, with ran-
domization of expression within each level. After
each presentation of a clip, the screen went blank.
At that point, participants were asked to identify
the emotion they thought they saw on the clip.
Scoring. For the test phase, there were two possi-
ble ways to score the dependent measures. The first
system was to count the total number of trials for
each emotion where the participant correctly







Figure 1. (a) Stimuli used for ‘‘happy’’; Levels 1 though 4. (b)
Stimuli used for ‘‘sad’’; Levels 1 though 4. (c) Stimuli used for
‘‘afraid’’; Levels 1 though 4. (d) Stimuli used for ‘‘angry’’; Levels
1 though 4. (e) Stimuli used for ‘‘disgusted’’; Levels 1 though 4
(used only in Experiment 2). (f) Stimuli used for ‘‘surprised’’;
Levels 1 though 4 (used only in Experiment 2).
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derived a total for each of the four emotions. For
the second system, the level at which each partici-
pant correctly identified the expression and then
continued to identify it correctly at every subse-
quent (i.e., easier) level was recorded. This number
was then translated into ‘‘number of consecutive
levels recognized’’ for each emotion. For example,
if the participant first correctly recognized happy at
Level II, and then identified it correctly again at
Levels III and IV, a score of 3 was earned (three
consecutive levels recognized; the participant was
able to accurately identify the emotion from the
50% level onward). If however, the participant first
correctly recognized happy at Level II, failed to
identify it correctly at Level III, but then again rec-
ognized it correctly again at Level IV, a score of 1
was earned (only one consecutive level recognized;
the participant was only able to accurately identify
the emotion consistently at the 100% level). This sec-
ond scoring system was used to obtain a more accu-
rate measure of when participants could identify the
expression, as they were less likely to be given credit
for randomly guessing the correct response on any
particular trial. The minimum score for each emotion
was 0, indicating none of the levels of that emotion
were recognized, and the highest score for each emo-
tion was a 4, indicating that all four levels had been
correctly identified.
Data were analyzed using both scoring systems,
and the results were essentially the same (the mean
when using the first system was necessarily
higher). Given that our second system provided a
more accurate measure of the participants’ perfor-
mance, number of consecutive levels recognized is
the variable reported in all subsequent analyses.
Results
A score of each participant’s average perfor-
mance was created by adding together their num-
ber of consecutive levels recognized score for each
of the four emotions and then dividing the total by
4. Higher scores indicated better performance. For
the both children with autism and control children,
neither age (autism: r = .33, n = 19, p = .16; control:
r = .05, n = 18, p = .86) nor standardized VMA
(autism: r = ).1, n = 19, p = .68; control: r = ).25,
n = 18, p = .31) were significantly correlated with
the average performance score.
A primary measure of interest was how the chil-
dren’s mean performance scores across all four
emotions differed by diagnosis. A t test was run on
the average performance score for the children with
autism (M = 1.80, SD = 0.52) versus the control
children (M = 2.42, SD = 0.59), t(35) = )3.34,
p < .01. As a group, the children with autism per-
formed significantly worse across emotions than
did the control children, suggesting a general diffi-
culty with emotion recognition.
The next measure of interest was how the groups
differed on the individual emotions; t tests (using a
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.0125) illus-
trated that although typically developing children
scored significantly better on afraid, t(35) = )3.92,
p < .001, and angry, t(35) = )2.38, p < .0125, they
were only marginally better for happy t(35) =
)1.38, p = .09, and showed no difference for sad,
t(35) = )0.60, p = .28 (see Figure 2 for mean).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that
although children with autism were able to accu-
rately recognize a number of the dynamic, briefly
presented emotion stimuli, they were generally not
as proficient as controls. Indeed, typically develop-
ing children were, on average, able to correctly iden-
tify anger and afraid stimuli at one full level of
subtlety earlier than children with autism. Impor-
tantly, although more pronounced in the children
with autism, both groups were less proficient at rec-
ognizing more subtle, briefly displayed emotions.
Aside from happy, for which both groups performed
relatively well, typically developing children could
recognize, on average, only two consecutive levels
(stimuli exhibiting 75% and 100% of the emotion) of
the other three emotions, whereas the children with
autism could recognize, on average, two consecutive
levels of sad, and could, on average, only reliably
identify afraid and angry by the final, easiest level
(stimuli exhibiting 100% of the emotion).
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Mean ‘‘Consecutive Correct’’ scores for
happy, sad, afraid, and angry.
^p = .09. *p < .00125. **p < .001.
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These findings illustrate that by as early as
5–7 years of age, children with autism are less pro-
ficient at recognizing some emotional expressions
than are typically developing children. This stands
in contrast to performance on the pretest and high-
lights the benefits of being able to process the stim-
uli for as long as needed. The results also illustrate
that children are not equally proficient at recogniz-
ing different emotions. Happy appeared to be the
easiest emotion for both groups to recognize, which
stands to reason given that happy is also the first
emotional expression that infants learn to discrimi-
nate (Bornstein & Arterberry, 2003; Kuchuk,
Vibbert, & Bornstein, 1986), and can be recognized
primarily by movement of the mouth (Ekman,
2003). The children with autism exhibited signifi-
cantly more difficulty with angry and afraid. These
two emotions require integration of information
from the mouth, eyes, and forehead, and if the chil-
dren with autism were relying on processing these
expressions in a more featural and less holistic
manner, this could account for the difficulties they
exhibited.
Given the relative difficulty in recognizing the
brief, subtle emotions experienced by the children
with autism in this experiment, an important ques-
tion is whether their skills would improve as they
enter later childhood, adolescence, and adulthood,
or if they would never become as proficient as typi-
cally developing individuals at recognizing these
expressions. To address this, Experiment 2 used the
same procedure with additional expressions and





Child participants were 26 children with high-
functioning autism and 23 typically developing
control children between the ages of 8 and 12. Ado-
lescent participants were 24 adolescents with high-
functioning autism and 25 typically developing
control adolescents (age 13–17 years). Adult partici-
pants were 21 adults with high-functioning autism
and 24 typically developing controls (age 18–
53 years). Control participants in each age group
(child, adolescent, and adult) were matched with
the autism group on age, full-scale IQ, verbal IQ,
and performance IQ. Table 2 summarizes the par-
ticipants’ demographic characteristics. No signifi-
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Child, Adolescent, and Adult Autism
and Control Groups for Experiment 2
Children
Autism group (n = 26) Control group (n = 23)
M SD M SD
Age (years) 10.46 1.27 10.26 1.63
VIQ 103.12 10.23 104.09 10.10
PIQ 110.00 17.53 108.04 9.10





Gender (M:F) 24:2 18:5
Ethnicity 26 Caucasian 21 Caucasian
2 African American
Adolescents
Autism group (n = 24) Control group (n = 25)
M SD M SD
Age (years) 14.96 1.23 14.64 1.25
VIQ 104.42 13.16 104.88 11.45
PIQ 107.33 10.80 105.08 9.52





Gender (M:F) 21:3 22:3
Ethnicity 19 Caucasian 22 Caucasian
1 Asian American 2 African American
4 Other 1 Other
Adults
Autism group (n = 21) Control group (n = 24)
M SD M SD
Age (years) 27.00 7.92 28.29 11.8
VIQ 104.24 13.18 105.33 6.90
PIQ 105.14 17.33 105.75 6.87





Gender (M:F) 20:1 20:4
Ethnicity 21 Caucasian 19 Caucasian
2 African American
1 Other
Note. ADOS = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule;
VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = performance IQ, FSIQ = full-scale IQ;
ADOS Comm = score on the Communication subscale; ADOS
Soc = score on the Reciprocal Social Interaction subscale;
ADOS Total = Comm + Soc. Ethnicity was obtained by parent
report.
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cant differences existed between the autism and
control groups on any of the demographic
variables.
Participants with autism were administered a
diagnostic evaluation consisting of the ADOS–G
(Lord et al., 2000) with confirmation by expert clini-
cal opinion. Additionally, the Autism Diagnostic
Interview–Revised (ADI–R; Lord, Rutter, & Le
Couteur, 1994) was administered to a parent, except
for two adult participants where a close relative
was interviewed. Both the ADOS–G and ADI–R
were scored using the DSM–IV (American Psychiat-
ric Association, 2000) scoring algorithm for autism
(see Table 2 for mean ADOS scores). Children and
adolescents with Asperger’s disorder or PDD–NOS
were excluded. Participants with autism were also
required to be in good medical health, free of sei-
zures, have a negative history of traumatic brain
injury, and have an IQ > 80 as determined by
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(Wechsler, 1999).
Control participants were volunteers recruited
from the community. Parents of potential control
participants completed questionnaires of demo-
graphic and family information to determine eligi-
bility. Control participants were required to be in
good physical health, free of past or current neuro-
logic or psychiatric disorders, have a negative fam-
ily history of first-degree relatives with major
psychiatric disorders, and have a negative family
history in first- and second-degree relatives of aut-
ism spectrum disorder. Control participants were
also excluded if they had a history of poor school
attendance or evidence of a disparity between
general level of ability and academic achievement
suggesting a learning disability. The Wide Range
Achievement Test–IV was administered to exclude
the presence of a learning disability.
Apparatus
Testing occurred in a quiet laboratory room.
Each participant sat in front of a 43-cm monitor
controlled by a computer.
Stimuli
Stimuli were exactly the same as those used in
Experiment 1, with the addition of two new emo-
tions, surprise and disgust (using unique models),
to both the pretest and test phase (test phase stim-
uli can be seen in Figure 1). Thus, for Experiment 2
there were a total of 24 trial stimuli (four clips of
each of the six emotions).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1
except answer choices appeared on the screen in




Scores on the pretest, which used the static pro-
totypic faces, varied somewhat more than in Exper-
iment 1. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted on the percent correct scores for the
pretest data (which included all six emotions as
well as neutral) with diagnosis (autism vs. control)
and age group (children vs. adolescents vs. adults)
as the between-subjects variables. Neither the inter-
action, F(2, 136) = 1.13, p = .33, nor either of the
main effects, diagnosis, F(1, 136) = 1.27, p = .26, or
age group, F(2, 136) = 1.52, p = .22 were significant,
indicating that all participants were equally adept
at identifying static, exaggerated emotional expres-
sions. Figure 3 illustrates the results from each
group.
Test
Several preliminary analyses determined whether
any group differences (autism vs. control) varied by
emotion or whether the emotions could be com-
bined for further analyses. These analyses indicated
that for the test phase, a consistent pattern of results
existed for afraid, angry, disgusted, and surprised,
but not for happy or sad. Indeed, a Diagno-
sis · Emotion interaction was found, F(5,
608) = 2.32, p < .05. Bonferroni post hoc test indi-
cated that only for happy (p = .57) and sad (p = .39)
Figure 3. Experiment 2: Mean percent correct of pretest
exaggerated expressions for all age groups.
1440 Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew, and Strauss
were there no significant differences between the
diagnostic groups. These findings paralleled Experi-
ment 1, which also showed that both groups per-
formed similarly on these two emotions. When
happy and sad were excluded from the analyses, the
Diagnosis · Emotion interaction was no longer sig-
nificant, F(3, 382) = 0.88, p = .45. Therefore, the first
set of analyses examined data for afraid, angry, dis-
gusted, and surprised, but excluded happy and sad.
The results for these two emotions are discussed
separately from the others.
Of primary interest was whether there were dif-
ferences between the groups in their ability to rec-
ognize expressions, and whether this differed by
age. Thus, a mixed ANOVA was conducted, with
emotion as the within-subject variable, and diagno-
sis (autism vs. control) and age group (children vs.
adolescent vs. adults) as between-subjects variables.
Results indicated a significant main effect of emo-
tion, F(3, 382) = 51.44, p < .001, and the Bonferroni
post hoc test indicated that performance was best
for surprise (which differed significantly from the
other three emotions; all ps < .001), followed by dis-
gust (which differed from anger and fear; both
ps < .05), followed by anger and fear, (which did
not differ significantly from each other; p = 1.0).
There was also a significant main effect of diag-
nosis, F(1, 136) = 16.57, p < .001, and age group,
F(2, 136) = 5.03, p < .01. More important, results
indicated a significant interaction between the
diagnosis and age group variables, F(2, 136) =
3.30, p < .05. The mean scores, collapsed across the
four emotions, are presented in Figure 4.
To understand this interaction, follow-up analy-
ses (Bonferroni post hoc tests) revealed that the
control adults were significantly better at identify-
ing the four emotions than were the adults with
autism (p < .001). In contrast, the performance of
the children and adolescents with autism did not
differ from their matched controls (ps = .22 and .17,
respectively). Additionally, the performance of the
control group differed significantly by age, F(2,
69) = 7.11, p < .01, with the post hoc test indicating
that control children performed marginally worse
than control adolescents (p = .06) and significantly
worse than the adults (p < .001). This difference
between age groups, however, was not seen in the
participants with autism, F(2,67) = 2.07, p = .13 (all
post hoc ps > .2).
Results for the individual emotions of afraid,
angry, disgust, and surprise are shown in Figures 5a
to 5d. As can be seen, the pattern for the individual
emotions reflects the collapsed results in that for
each expression, the control adults perform signifi-
cantly better than do the adults with autism (using
a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.01, all tests
are t tests with p < .01, except for afraid, where
p = .08). In contrast, the child and adolescent aut-
ism and control groups do not differ from each
other on any of the individual expressions (chil-
dren, all ps > .19; adolescents, all ps > .11).
The pattern for happy and sad diverged from the
other four emotions. Most participants were at ceil-
ing for happy; thus, the means for each group were
very similar (see Figure 6a). A two-way ANOVA of
diagnosis (autism vs. control) and age group (chil-
dren vs. adolescents vs. adults) yielded no signifi-
cant main effect of diagnosis, F(1, 136) = 0.32,
p = .57, or age group, F(2, 136) = 1.63, p = .2, and no
significant interaction, F(2, 136) = 0.33, p = .72.
Results for sad were anomalous (see Figure 6b)
in that most participant in all groups performed at
or close to floor. A two-way ANOVA showed that
the main effects of diagnosis, F(1, 136) = 0.75,
p = .39, and age group, F(2, 136) = 0.04, p = .97
were not significant, and neither was the interaction
F(2, 136) = 1.40, p = .25.
Discussion
Results of Experiment 2 again emphasize the
importance of testing the limits of emotion recogni-
tion abilities in individuals with autism. Although
none of the groups (based on diagnosis or age
group) differed in their abilities to recognize proto-
typic stimuli presented without time limits, all
groups exhibited relative difficulty when the stim-
uli were more subtle and displayed only briefly. Of
note was how performance differed by both diag-
nosis and age group. A general improvement in
performance with increasing age was seen in the
control group in that the control adults performed
significantly better than the control children. This
Figure 4. Experiment 2: Mean and standard error of
‘‘Consecutive Correct’’ scores by age group collapsed across
afraid, angry, disgusted, and surprised.
*p < .001.
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developmental difference, however, was not seen
in the individuals with autism. The adults with
autism performed no better than the children with
autism. It appears that the emotion recognition
skills of the children with autism ‘‘catch up’’ to
their typically developing peers between the ages
of 8 and 12 years, and remain relatively comparable
through adolescence. However, whereas typically
developing children continue to develop profi-
ciency for recognizing emotional expressions
through to adulthood, individuals with autism do
not seem to be able refine their skills beyond those
present by late childhood.
As with the young children in Experiment 1,
happy was the easiest expression for all partici-
pants in Experiment 2 to discriminate, and many
individuals were at ceiling for this emotion. This
contributed to the lack of variability within the
happy results and in turn led us to analyze this
emotion separately. It is unclear as to what contrib-
uted to the anomalous results for sad in this sam-
ple. A number of participants (both individuals
with autism and controls) performed at floor for all
levels of this emotion, again reducing variability in
the results and motivating us to examine it sepa-
rately from the other emotions. The most likely
explanation for this result is that there was some-
thing inherent in the particular stimulus used for
the study that presented specific difficulty for the
individuals in Experiment 2.
General Discussion
This was the first study to look at the ability to rec-
ognize facial expressions in young children through
to adults in both typically developing individuals
and individuals with autism. In contrast to prior
research, this study controlled for the subtlety of
the expressions and required participants make
judgments of only briefly presented dynamic
expressions. As mentioned earlier, such manipula-
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Mean and standard error of ‘‘consecutive correct’’ scores by age group for (a) afraid, (b) angry, (c) disgusted,
and (d) surprised.
^p = .08. *p < .01.
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tions are extremely important. To date, the majority
of research with both typically developing individ-
uals and with individuals with autism has
presented only prototypic expressions and allowed
the participants to the view the expressions for as
long as necessary before identifying them. Under
such conditions, both developmental changes and
potential differences between populations may be
masked by what are likely ceiling effects in perfor-
mance. This was clearly evident in our results of no
group differences in the pretests.
When considering the results from the typically
developing individuals, it appears that with devel-
opment, these individuals become more proficient
at recognizing subtle facial expressions; there was
continuing improvement in the ability to recognize
facial expressions from the child group through to
the adult group. Although our paradigm was dif-
ferent, these findings are similar to those of Thomas
et al. (2007), who also found an improvement into
adulthood. Thus, our results provide further evi-
dence that many previous findings of no improve-
ment in emotion recognition after the age of 10
(e.g., Bruce et al., 2000; Mondloch et al., 2003) may
have resulted from these studies using methods
that lead to performance ceiling effects. That is, by
showing participants prototypical expressions and
allowing unlimited time to respond, developmental
changes that may be occurring past middle
childhood have been masked. Given that there does
appear to be improvement through to adulthood, at
issue is what is changing with development.
Behavioral studies of face processing suggest
that typically developing individuals slowly shift
from a predominant reliance on more featural pro-
cessing of faces in young childhood to ultimately
having adult expertise in configural processing of
faces (Mondloch, Dobson, Parsons, & Maurer, 2004;
Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002; Schwarzer,
2000). Configural processing is typically seen as the
ability to perceive the spatial distances or relation-
ships among aspects of the faces (e.g., eye separa-
tion) as opposed to attending to single nonspatial
features such as the nose (Maurer, Le Grand, &
Mondloch, 2002). For emotion recognition, how-
ever, this distinction between configural and featur-
al aspects of the face may not be as straightforward
as is usually depicted in the facial recognition liter-
ature. Spatial distances can also vary in how easily
they can be discriminated. For example, categoriz-
ing or perceiving whether a face is demonstrating
fear or surprise requires the ability to pick up mus-
cle movement difference in the eye region (Ekman,
2003). When these expressions are prototypic or
exaggerated, the amount of spatial movement from
neutral to the full expression is much larger then
when these expressions are subtle. Thus, in order
to discriminate subtle facial expressions, individu-
als must be able to perceive very small motoric
spatial differences of the muscles. We are sug-
gesting that with development, not only do typical
individuals rely more on configural information,
but they also get better at making subtle configural
discriminations; thus, they may be getting better at
picking up very small changes in muscle move-
ments that occur during more subtle displays of
emotion.
There is also evidence that with development,
typically developing individuals become better at
recognizing and categorizing faces (e.g., Carey, Dia-
mond, & Woods, 1980). Most cognitive models of
face recognition in adults assume that individuals
compare the faces they are viewing to either stored
exemplars or a multidimensional prototype that
contains the mean of all of the dimensions that typ-
ically vary in faces (e.g., Valentine & Endo, 1992).
Valentine and others have called this multidimen-
sional representation the ‘‘face space.’’ It is
assumed that the center of this face space repre-
sents the central tendency of all the features and
configurations that vary in faces. As an individual
(b)
(a)
Figure 6. Experiment 2: Mean and standard error of ‘‘consecutive
correct’’ scores by age group for (a) happy and (b) sad.
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gains experience with faces in their environ-
ment, the faces are represented in this face space
according to the values of their features. More typi-
cal values (and therefore more typical faces) lie
closer to the center of this framework, whereas less
typical faces fall along the outer edges of the frame-
work (Valentine, 1991). The development of a
face-space framework depends on experience and
necessitates that over time, individuals be able to
abstract both central tendencies and the range of
values of features from their experience with faces.
In essence, as children get older they continue to
develop a more refined prototype. Essentially, the
face space represents the totality of an individual’s
experiences with faces and can be viewed as the
knowledge base that drives ‘‘top-down’’ perceptual
learning processes that allow individuals to make
more subtle facial discriminations as experience
and learning increases.
Although the face-space model has not previ-
ously been applied to recognizing emotional expres-
sions, it is likely that emotional expressions are also
discriminated by comparing multiple aspects of the
to-be-categorized expression (e.g., the movement of
the eyes region, mouth, or eyebrows) to separate
prototypes of each of the expressions. Essentially,
recognizing facial expressions can be considered a
type of categorization task (Humphreys et al., 2007).
As with faces, facial expression categories may have
‘‘typicality structures’’ where individual instances
of an expression vary in typicality. It is likely that
prototypical expressions are easiest to categorize,
and as expressions become more subtle or less pro-
totypical, comparisons to prototypes becomes more
difficult thus the expression is more difficult to
categorize. Similar to the development of face
recognition, with development and consequently
experience, this comparison process may become
more sophisticated and precise as individuals
develop proficiency at discriminating expressions.
Over development, children and adolescents are not
necessarily developing new or different underlying
processes, but rather they are getting more efficient
at processing subtle configural information and
comparing the information to a central representa-
tion (McKone & Boyer, 2006).
In the current study, the results from the individ-
uals with autism found that though young children
with autism did not recognize expressions as well
as the typically developing controls, these group
differences were not seen with the older children.
However, by adulthood, individuals with autism
were again performing worse than the typically
developing controls. In essence, the adults with aut-
ism never seem to attain the levels of proficiency at
emotion recognition of typically developing adults.
These findings seem to indicate, as suggested ear-
lier, that the lack of a developmental approach and
a failure to consider task demands may be contrib-
uting to the equivocal findings regarding emotion
recognition skills in this population.
Some previous research has shown that individ-
uals with autism have impairments only in recog-
nizing certain emotions. Although this has varied
from surprise (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993)
to anger (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001), the some-
what more consistent finding has been that they
exhibit a specific deficit in the recognition of fear
(Howard et al., 2000; Humphreys et al., 2007;
Pelphrey et al., 2002). Our findings did not show
any specific deficit for one particular emotion. In
the youngest age group, the children with autism
performed worst on afraid and angry, but the mean
score for angry was no lower than that for afraid.
In all three of our older age groups, there was no
one emotion that caused specific difficulty over and
above the others for the individuals with autism. It
is not clear how to interpret our results in light of
the previous findings because the current study
was the only one to simultaneously vary expression
intensity, use motion, and limit how long partici-
pants had to view the expression. Additionally,
when only one exemplar of each expression is used
(as was the case in the current study as well as
others), results may be idiosyncratic to the particu-
lar exemplar used for each expression. The current
study was not designed to carefully compare per-
formance on different expressions, and future
research designed to do so will require multiple
exemplars of each expression and intensity.
At issue is why the adults with autism never
reach the levels of proficiency at emotion recogni-
tion of typically developing adults. Research on the
face recognition abilities of individuals with autism
has suggested that they have a tendency to process
faces and, hence, probably facial expressions, based
more on featural than configural information (see
reviews by Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005;
Sasson, 2006). It is unclear from this research
whether individuals with autism are unable to pro-
cess configural information or whether they are just
less efficient at processing this information. McK-
one and colleagues (Gilchrist & McKone, 2003;
McKone & Boyer, 2006) have found that in typically
developing individuals, even young children can
process configural facial information provided that
information is obvious (e.g., a large degree of eye
separation). They suggest that with development,
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there is not a shift in processing strategies from fea-
tures to configurations, but rather there is a devel-
oping ability to process subtle configural
information. Similarly, it may be that individuals
with autism are able to process spatial information,
but they do not achieve the level of proficiency
needed to perceive subtle facial expressions as well
as typically developing adults can.
A second contributory factor may be that individ-
uals with autism have poor mental representations
of the basic emotions. As discussed, to develop a
mature representation of faces (e.g., a face space) it
is necessary abstract prototypic representations of
facial information. With respect to emotion, it is
critical to have stored prototypic representations or
exemplars of the basic emotional expressions.
Research with individuals who have autism
suggests that they may have difficulties in abstract-
ing prototypical representations of categorical infor-
mation (e.g., Gastgeb, Strauss, & Minshew, 2006;
Klinger & Dawson, 2001). Thus, it might be expected
that individuals with autism would have difficulty
comparing a subtle facial expression to their inade-
quately formed stored prototypic representations of
the different basic expressions. Interestingly, recent
results have suggested that individuals with autism
have difficulty not only with face categories but
seem to have a general difficulty processing and cat-
egorizing complex, subordinate stimuli (Behrmann
et al., 2006; Gastgeb et al., 2006). Thus, the difficulty
exhibited with subtle facial expressions may be
more general in nature.
Although this study was not designed to test
these various possibilities, it is the first study to
demonstrate how the ability to recognize emotional
expression compares in individuals with autism
and typically developing individuals at different
ages. More important, it demonstrates that while
even young children with autism are able to per-
ceive prototypic facial expressions, individuals with
autism never achieve a level of proficiency that is
comparable to typically developing adults. As the
underlying causes of these differences are explored
in future research, it will be critically important for
future studies to carefully control the difficulty of
the emotion expression task to with respect to both
the subtlety of the expressions and the amount of
time individuals have to process this information.
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Appendix A









1 86.2 3.79 (1.01)
2 93.1 3.79 (1.21)
3 86.2 4.48 (0.91)











1 6.9 2.79 (1.24)
2 37.9 3.21 (1.24)
3 65.5 3.48 (1.18)
4 69 4.59 (0.63)
Angry
1 3.4 2.97 (0.91)
2 31.0 3.48 (1.15)
3 51.7 3.35 (1.17)
4 79.3 4.24 (0.91)
Afraid
1 17.2 2.79 (1.11)
2 65.5 3.79 (1.08)
3 93.1 4.41 (0.63)
4 82.8 4.58 (0.63)
a‘‘Confidence in own rating’’ scale was a 7-point Likert scale
with 1 = just guessing to 7 = completely sure.
Appendix B
Instructions for Test Phase: Experiment 1
This is a game where you are going to look at
people’s faces and try to guess what they are feel-
ing. You are going to see movies of people’s faces,
and your job is to tell me how that person is feel-
ing. First you are going to see a yellow ball on the
screen and you need to look at the ball very closely,
because the movies are going to be really fast, like
this (snap fingers), and then you won’t see them
anymore. For each face you can choose from these
(point to iconic faces): ‘‘happy,’’ ‘‘sad,’’ ‘‘angry,’’
‘‘scared,’’ or ‘‘none.’’ OK? Let’s practice first. In
some of the movies, it will be easy to tell what the
person is feeling, like this one (present sample
‘‘happy’’ clip, at Level IV), and some of them are
going to be hard, like this one (present sample
‘‘happy’’ clip at Level I). Ready to start?
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